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ZARDA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION EXPRESSION:
A NEW HIGH FOR TITLE VII INTERPRETATION
Nico Ramos†
Imagine the rumble of a plane’s single engine as it reaches its desired altitude.
You are faced with your most important work responsibility, a task that has a
very small margin of error. Your extensive training and certifications have
prepared you for this moment; you are about to guide a person on their very first
skydive. Tightly strapped to your client, you walk her to the edge of the plane’s
open dock as she shakes nervously. The sounds of wind require you to scream
despite only being inches away from the first timer’s ear, “jump on three!”
Looking down from 13,000 feet, you thrust both bodies out of the plane. In a
nearly 60 second free fall, you haven’t forgotten your main responsibility: to
ensure that the life attached to you makes it safely back to the hangar. The years
of training pays off. Adeptly and with perfect timing, you pull the strap; a
specially folded parachute catapults from your back; you firmly grasp the person
in front of you so that they are stabilized as the deployed chute drastically
reduces the speed at which you were plummeting. After absorbing the one of a
kind views, you prepare for landing. Success! Both you and your passenger
completed a tandem skydive; she experienced an exhilarating adrenaline rush,
and you ensured that she experienced it safely. Now, imagine; two days later,
for something that has no relation to your employment record or ability to
perform your job, you are fired and left without recourse. For many Americans,
this requires no imagination at all. This is exactly what happened to sky diving
instructor Donald Zarda. Despite jumping out of planes for a living, the most
serious risk Mr. Zarda took before completing a tandem skydive on a warm
summer day in 2010 was revealing that he was gay.
Approximately 75 percent of Americans are under the mistaken impression
that there are federal anti-discrimination protections for lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and queer or questioning (LGBTQ) people.1 Though nearly 70
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1. ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., A SHIFTING LANDSCAPE: A DECADE OF CHANGE IN AMERICAN
ATTITUDES ABOUT SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND LGBT ISSUES 35 (2013), https://www.prri.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/2014.LGBT_REPORT-1.pdf (noting the knowledge of employment
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percent of voters support federal laws barring workplace discrimination for gay
and transgender people, there are no such federal protections.2 States have
attempted to remedy the absence of federal law; however, as of 2017, in 28
states, it is permissible to fire individuals based on sexual orientation.3 A gay
person can exercise his or her constitutional right to marry, and then
subsequently be lawfully fired for exercising it.4
Evolving Supreme Court interpretation of Title VII has provided a foundation
for a new approach in addressing whether sexual orientation discrimination is
protected by Title VII.5 A growing number of courts are finding sexual
orientation to be a proxy for sex, establishing that negative employment actions
based on sexual orientation are a prohibited form of workplace discrimination
based on a person’s gender.6
In Zarda v. Altitude Express, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit directly addressed the issue.7 By examining legislative history,
Supreme Court rulings, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)

nondiscrimination laws); see 2017 Workplace Equality Fact Sheet: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Workplace Discrimination at a Glance, OUT & EQUAL,
http://outandequal.org/2017-workplace-equality-fact-sheet/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2019) (asserting
that one quarter of LGBTQ Americans admit they have experienced workplace discrimination once
in the past five years); see also Shabab Ahmed Mirza et al., The State of the LGBTQ Community in
the Labor Market: Pre-June 2018 Jobs Day Release, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 5, 2018, 9:01
AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/ news/2018/07/05/453094/state-lgbtqcommunity-labor-market-pre-june-2018-jobs-day-release/ (indicating studies that job applicants
who identify as LGBTQ on their resume are less likely to receive callbacks in comparison to
applicants who do not self-identify).
2. JONES, supra note 1, at 34.
3. See 2017 Workplace Equality Fact Sheet, supra note 1.
4. Tessa M. Register, The Case for Deferring to the EEOC’s Interpretations in Macy and
Foxx to Classify LGBT Discrimination as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 102 IOWA L. REV.
1397, 1398 (2017). See also Lisa Bornstein & Megan Bench, Advancing LGBTQIA Rights in a
Post- Obergefell World: Married on Sunday, Fired on Monday: Approaches to Federal LGBT Civil
Rights Protections, 22 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 31, 42–43 (2015) (suggesting that judicial
advances have allowed for Title VII expansion by helping to shift American attitudes on gender
roles, gender equality, and sexual orientation with each subsequent case building off the preceding
holding).
5. Robert Brookins, A Rose by Any Other Name . . . The Gender Basis of Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 441, 537 (1998).
6. Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Discrimination on Basis of Sexual Orientation as Form of
Sex Discrimination Proscribed by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28. A.L.R. FED. 3D 4, § 2
(2018). These approaches in interpreting “because of sex” discrimination are based on interpretive
analysis of the term “sex” itself. Id. The crux of the argument is that ambiguous text should be
read broadly in terms to reach the ultimate goal of the statute and that the Supreme Court has applied
a broad application to the term sex. Id.
7. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
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guidance and competing circuit approaches, the court, sitting en banc, overruled
decades of precedence with a persuasive legal argument that is becoming
increasingly utilized by other jurisdictions, establishing sexual orientation
discrimination as a cognizable claim under Title VII.8
Passed by the 88th Congress, Title VII of the momentous Civil Rights Act of
1964 established protections against invidious workplace discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, and sex.9 The prohibition against discrimination “because
of sex” was a last minute addition to the bill,10 resulting in a dearth of
Congressional intent as to how “because of sex” was to be defined.11 Early
Supreme Court cases brought under Title VII utilized a narrow definition of sex
discrimination,12 and in the same spirit, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has rigidly interpreted Title VII to exclude sexual orientation
discrimination from its many protections, meaning a plaintiff who experienced
sexual orientation discrimination was barred from alleging a violation of Title
VII.13 However, the definition of sex discrimination is not static; it took on a
broader meaning after the EEOC held in Baldwin v. Foxx that a complaint
alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation falls within the
Commission’s jurisdiction and that sexual orientation discrimination is
discrimination based on sex.14 The Second Circuit re-examined the issue.15 By
analyzing the Supreme Court’s permissive approach to “because of sex”
discrimination in light of changing EEOC policy and divergent circuit

8. Id. at 107–08.
9. Surette, supra note 6, at § 2.
10. Tiffany L. King, Comment, Working Out: Conflicting Title VII Approaches to Sex
Discrimination and Sexual Orientation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1014 (2002).
11. Charly Shane Gilfoil, Note, More than Just “Sex:” Title VII, The Expanding Meaning of
Sex Discrimination, and the Court’s Role in Correcting Injustice, 19 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 135,
139 (2017); see Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (holding that denying
a woman employment due to having a pre-school aged child while not denying a man the same
position in employment despite having a pre-school aged child violated Title VII prohibition on
disparate treatment of women).
12. Gilfoil, supra note 11, at 139.
13. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude Express,
Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
14. Baldwin v. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015). An Air Traffic
Control Specialist in Miami filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging he was subjected to
discrimination for being a gay male, and was not selected for promotion due to his sexual
orientation. Id. at *1–2. The EEOC accepted the complaint for investigation and held that sexual
orientation discrimination requires and impermissible consideration of gender. Id.
15. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112–13.
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approaches, the Second Circuit, for the first time, recognized sexual orientation
discrimination as a cognizable claim under Title VII.16
This Note examines the implications of Zarda in the workplace. Part I
provides the relevant prior law leading up to the case by exploring the landscape
of Title VII’s legislative history and the Supreme Court’s evolving approach in
interpreting, “because of sex” discrimination. Part I will further examine the
EEOC’s novel approach to Title VII and its subsequent influence utilized by the
Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, where a
female professor alleged that she was denied promotion because she was in a
relationship with a woman—ultimately influencing the Second Circuit’s
approach.17 Part II will detail the relevant facts and ultimate holding of the
Zarda court, including an explanation of the concurrences and dissents. Part III
will discuss the reasoning employed by the Second Circuit and analyze the three
most utilized approaches in analyzing Title VII, associational, comparative, and
gender stereotyping, culminating with an analysis of the best legal argument to
successfully extend Title VII protections to sexual orientation.
I. TITLE VII: BACKGROUND
A. Scarce Legislative History
Title VII provides:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or . . . adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.18
At its inception, the provision was intended to foster equal employment
opportunities and to do away with historical barriers against minorities and
women in the workplace.19 The prohibition of discrimination “based on sex”

16. Surette, supra note 6, at § 2.
17. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2016).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012).
19. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that race
discrimination was the primary concern of Congress in its enactment).
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was added on the last day of the statute’s floor debate.20 Opponents of the act
believed that the last minute addition of “sex” based prohibitions would defeat
the bill due to the controversial nature of federal protections for women in
employment.21 Ultimately the plan failed and Congress drafted Title VII to
include sex discrimination as a necessary component to a broader prohibition on
workplace discrimination.22 Congress, for lack of time, failed to define the term,
leaving little left for courts to analyze in the context of Congressional intent for
elucidating what “because of sex” discrimination means.23 As a result, early
Title VII cases applied a definition of “because of sex” to a narrow set of
circumstances most consistent with lawmakers’ initial understanding when Title
VII was ratified: sex discrimination means the exclusion of women in the
workplace, meaning, only women could successfully allege violation of Title
VII’s sex discrimination prohibitions.24 It did not take long for “instances of
unwelcome and unanticipated workplace scenarios”25 to challenge the limits of
“because of sex” discrimination’s early delineation.26 In a series of decisions
from the 1980s, the Court decamped from the original interpretation of Title
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination beginning with permitting males to allege
“because of sex” discrimination in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
v. EEOC.27
After recognizing that a male can allege sex discrimination, the Court in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, again broadened its interpretation of sex to
accord with Congress’ broader attempt at eliminating multiple forms of
discrimination in the workplace.28
Though early cases limited sex
discrimination to: 1) denying employment/promotion to women, or 2)
preventing employers from implementing policies that benefit one gender over
another; the Court began to address how Title VII was to apply in situations of

20. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Sex as a basis
of discrimination was added as a floor amendment one day before the House approved Title VII,
without prior hearing or debate.”).
21. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–
84 (1964)).
22. Major Velma Cheri Gay, Fifty Years Later . . . Still Interpreting the Meaning of “Because
of Sex” Within Title VII and Whether it Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 73 A.F.L.
REV. 61, 67 (2015).
23. King, supra note 10, at 1007–08.
24. Gilfoil, supra note 11, at 139.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 675–76 (1983)
(holding that an employer violated Title VII’s prohibition by creating benefits that advantaged
women employees while disadvantaging men employees).
28. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986).
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sexual harassment.29 Despite Title VII’s initial application to protect women
from discrimination in the workplace and never once mentioning sexual
harassment in the bill itself or floor debate, the Court reasoned that
Congressional silence on sexual harassment pertaining to Title VII could not
contemplate the extent and reach of the statute’s protections, ultimately adding
sexual harassment to the broader protections of Title VII’s prohibitions on
discrimination “because of sex.”30
Seven years later, the Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
again extended “because of sex” to include male on male sexual harassment.31
The Scalia opinion found, “no justification in the statutory language or of our
precedents” to bar a plaintiff from recovery when the facts indicate that adverse
employment treatment was based on the plaintiff’s sex.32 This permissive
approach taken by the Court has resulted in Title VII claims that were not
initially considered during its ratification, yet not explicitly prohibited.33 The
Court has justified its approach, stating that Title VII “evinces a congressional
intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’
in employment.”34 Oncale directly addressed the Court’s interpretation of
Congressional intent for the application of Title VII protections:
[M]ale-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not
the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title
VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed.35

29. Id. at 64–65.
30. Id. A heterosexual male defendant raped, intimidated and exchanged sexual favors in
exchange for allowing a female plaintiff to retain her job. Id. at 60.
31. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
32. Id. at 79. A male oil-platform crew member, who was physically assaulted, threatened
with rape, and was the subject of sexually themed actions by other male crew members, alleged he
was discriminated against in his employment because of his sex. Id. at 77. The Court found that
Title VII permited a claim of sex discrimination despite the plaintiff and defendant being of the
same sex. Id. at 79–80.
33. Discrimination based on sex under Title VII is the fourth most common claim of
workplace discrimination. See EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2017 Enforcement and Litigation Data,
EEOC (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-25-18.cfm (last visited
Aug. 21, 2019) (discovering the more than 25,000 allegations of discrimination based on sex in
2017, alleged sexual harassment in nearly 26% of those complaints).
34. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (1978)).
35. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
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Covering reasonable evils is illustrative of the Court’s approach that “has . . .
attempted to read ambiguous text consistent with Title VII’s broader
purposes.”36
By 1993, nearly 30 years after Title VII’s passage, the definition of sex
discrimination had evolved to represent a multitude of nefarious work place
scenarios.37 Harris v. Forklift Systems added to the evolution by recognizing a
second form of sexual harassment: hostile work environment.38 The Court again
opted for a broad definition of “because of sex,” holding that a hostile work
environment contributes to a “discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment”39
and therefore, violated Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because
of . . . sex.”40
B. Reasonable Comparable Evils: The Permissive Approach to Because of Sex
Discrimination and Gender Stereotyping
In a landmark 1989 holding, the Court provided one of the broadest
interpretations of Title VII’s prohibitions by establishing sex-stereotyping as a
form of sex discrimination.41 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a senior manager
at an accounting firm was denied a promotion because she exhibited masculine
traits such as: not wearing makeup, acting aggressively, and dressing in nonfeminine attire.42 The Court looked to precedent,43 and the language of Title
VII.44 Justice Brennan’s opinion interpreted the provision “to mean that gender

36. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII: Strengthening
It or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2014). See William R. Corbett, Babbling About
Employment Discrimination Law: Does the Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great
Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 685 (2010) (“From the beginning, it was an astoundingly
ambitious, and perhaps audacious, project. Congress envisioned a tower of law that would elevate
people . . . by attempting to eradicate invidious employment discrimination.”).
37. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993).
38. Id. at 18–19.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Id.
41. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See King, supra note 10, at 1021–
23. See also Cody Perkins, Comment: Sex and Sexual Orientation: Title VII After Macy v. Holder,
65 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 432–33 (2013).
42. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231–35.
43. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (holding that a
differential discriminatory action occurs when “treatment of a person in a manner which but for
that person’s sex would be different”). The Court further provided that the statute focuses “on
fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes.” Id. at 709.
44. Providing that it is unlawful for
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must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”45 The decision further drifted
from a one-dimensional interpretation of sex discrimination, reasoning for the
broader application that discrimination due to a deviation of “gender norms” or
conducting one’s self in a manner that is associated with the opposite gender is
a form of sex discrimination for the purposes of Title VII because it takes
“gender into account.”46
In light of the Supreme Court broadening what it means to discriminate
“because of sex,” Congress remained silent, never further narrowing or clearly
defining the term in regards to Title VII.47 In 1994, Congress passed the GenderMotivated Violence Act (GMVA), a subsection of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA), creating a private cause of action for a victim of gender
stereotyping.48 Although the private cause of action was later struck down by
the Supreme Court on separation of powers reasons, it is important to note that
Congress codified the term “gender” after the Price Waterhouse decision,
indicating that Congress accorded with the interpretation.49 Price Waterhouse
marked a further untethering of the restrictive definition given in the earlier Title
VII cases.50 This decision was not rooted in explicit instruction or legislative
history; instead, it echoed “Congress’ intent to forbid employers to take gender

an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge…or otherwise to discriminate with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or to “limit,
segregate, or classify . . . in anyway which would deprive . . . any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect . . . an employee, because of
such individual’s sex.”
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)). The Court reasoned that
“Congress’ intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions
appears on the face of the statute.” Id. at 239.
45. Id. at 240.
46. Id. at 244–45.
47. Gilfoil, supra note 11, at 140. See Luke A. Boso, Acting Gay, Acting Straight: Sexual
Orientation Stereotyping, 83 TENN. L. REV. 575, 577 (2016). Sex stereotyping is now becoming
used as an evidentiary tool for plaintiffs in sexual orientation discrimination cases. Id.
48. See King, supra note 10, at 1023–24. See also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201
n.12 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress codified the GMVA with full
knowledge of the Supreme Court’s definition of sex and gender, denoting an intention to preserve
the Court’s reasoning in legislation. Id.
49. See King, supra note 10, at 1023–24. See also Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201 n.12 (citing
Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Smith, 94. F.3d 1270, 1275 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “when Congress
adopts language” from court precedent, Congress intends the term to have the same meaning as
case law)).
50. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1307, 1309 (2012).
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into account . . . on the face of the statute,”51 therefore recognizing that “Title
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination must reach situations that were likely not
contemplated by the 88th Congress.”52
II. CAUSES OF ACTION: TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION
A. Causes of Action
To establish a cause of action for a violation of Title VII’s prohibition of
discrimination, a plaintiff must first “establish membership in a protected
class.”53 Though initially addressing the disparate treatment of women in
regards to employment opportunities, the Court has now provided that “because
of sex” discrimination, can encompass many forms of conduct.54 For example,
a policy that disparately affects women as opposed to men, or disparate
treatment towards an employee because she is female constitutes Title VII
violations in the purest form of a prima facie case.55
Once courts understood Title VII to include sexual harassment, the majority
of jurisdictions required a plaintiff to show: (1) he/she was discriminated against
because of sex; and (2) that the discrimination was severe to the point of

51. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239.
52. Gilfoil, supra note 11, at 141.
53. Gay, supra note 22, at 69 (The overwhelming theory in employment discrimination is that
most employers do not leave evidence of their discriminatory intent; therefore, the Supreme Court
established a framework, making it easier for a plaintiff to succeed in employment discrimination
cases.). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, to establish a prima facie case under Title VII,
a plaintiff must illustrate 1) membership within a protected class; 2) the professional competency
to perform their job; 3) the employer acted adversely to them; and 4) show facts and circumstances
that lend support to an inference of discrimination. Gay, supra note 22, at 69 (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
54. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–54 (1981) (holding that once
a plaintiff has established protected class status for purposes of Title VII, it is then up to the
employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer had a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,” for its action against the employee or applicant); see also King, supra note
10, at 1014–15.
55. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252–53. Disparate treatment sex discrimination occurs where there
is “overt or intentional discrimination” by an employer against a group or individual because of the
group or individual’s sex. Gay, supra note 22, at 69–70 (finding an employee must show exposure
to “disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment that the other sex [has] not.” On the other
end of the spectrum, disparate impact sex discrimination causes of action can result from what
appears to be facially neutral employment practices that are applied evenly to employees but have
a disproportionate impact that excludes women or men of equal employment, and there is no
requirement for the plaintiff to show intent.).
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“alter[ing] the terms or conditions of . . . employment and created an abusive
working environment.”56
There are three approaches for a plaintiff to establish a same-sex sexual
harassment suit: (1) plaintiff can show harassment was motivated by sexual
desire; (2) can show that the accused harasser was motivated by hostility towards
the presence of the plaintiff’s sex in the workplace; or (3) can produce evidence
that shows a harasser treated men and women differently.57 Disparate
impact/treatment, sexual harassment, and hostile work environments are not
exhaustive; circuits have also recognized a gender stereotyping claim, rooted in
the majority opinion in Price Waterhouse.58 To succeed, a plaintiff must show
that the adverse employment action taken by an accused harasser or employer
was to punish a plaintiff’s failure to adhere to gender norms.59
B. Traditional Approaches to Denying Protections
The traditional approach to denying Title VII protections against sexual
orientation has been supported by three viewpoints.60 First, courts have
provided that Title VII cannot apply because sexuality was not considered when
Title VII was passed.61 Second, courts look to the lack of subsequent legislative
action by Congress to include sexual orientation prohibitions.62 A third
approach warns of the risk of judicial expansion of Title VII because it could
create a new protected class.63
Prior to Zarda, the Second Circuit adhered to the traditional majority
approach, disqualifying employees and applicants who are discriminated against
because of their sexuality from showing a cognizable claim of disparate
treatment/impact, sexual harassment or hostile work environment.64 The Second

56. Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1134 (10th Cir. 2005).
57. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998).
58. Surette, supra note 6, at § 5; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
See also Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding it unable
to distinguish whether a plaintiff was harassed due to his homosexuality or his effeminate nature,
the Third Circuit determined he had a cognizable claim under Title VII because there was evidence
to suggest that he operated in his work duties with a high voice and feminine walk).
59. Surette, supra note 6, at § 34.
60. Register, supra note 4, at 1416–17.
61. Id. at 1417.
62. Id. at 1418.
63. Id.
64. At the time of the Zarda decision, several circuits had rulings in place that disallowed
sexual orientation as a basis for claims of workplace discrimination, to include the First, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Eight, and Tenth Circuits. See Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471
(6th Cir. 2012); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2009); Medina v.
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Circuit previously provided that sexual orientation discrimination is not
sufficient to establish that an employer acted adversely for failure to act as a
stereotypical man or woman.65
C. The EEOC and Three Arguments: Associational, Comparative and GenderStereotyping
Within the confines of “Title VII, Congress created the [EEOC] to resolve
claims and disputes” of discrimination in employment practices.66 Due to the
uncertainty of legislative intent as to the term “sex” in sex discrimination, federal
courts and administrative agencies such as the EEOC have had to resort to their
own guidelines and interpretations of Title VII which in turn heavily influence
circuit decisions.67
In 2016, the EEOC issued a decision in which it determined that a claim
“alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 lies within the Commission’s jurisdiction.”68 The
EEOC took a novel approach for the agency and focused the inquiry on whether
or not the employer “has ‘relied on sex-based considerations’ or ‘take[n] gender
into account’ when taking the challenged employment action.”69
This conclusion found support via three approaches employed by the EEOC.70
First, there is a comparative argument: sexual orientation discrimination
necessarily requires taking a person’s sex into consideration.71 Second, there is
an associational argument: the EEOC found that sexual orientation
discrimination is a type of associational discrimination.72 The third approach, a
gender stereotyping argument, which has become the most successful argument

Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138,
143 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989).
65. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005).
66. Gay, supra note 22, at 68 (The EEOC achieves this “through compliance, informal
voluntary agreements, and informal employment practices.” To that end, “the EEOC has the
authority to investigate accusations of discrimination against covered employers that are submitted
by an applicant or employee . . . .” Such applicant or employee is required by Title VII to go
through the EEOC before filing a lawsuit in court.).
67. Gay, supra note 22, at 68–69.
68. Baldwin v. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641, at *1 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015).
69. Id. at *4 (quoting Macy v. Holder, 2012 WL 1435995, at *6 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012)).
70. Id. at *4–5.
71. Id. at *5–6.
72. Id. at *6–7.
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among federal courts,73 adapts the Price Waterhouse prohibition on taking
“gender into account” and the “comparable evils” framework of Oncale.74 This
argument suggests that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex
discrimination because it relies on a person failing to adhere to a form of gender
stereotyping: men are supposed to date women and women date men. 75 The
EEOC ultimately held that sexual orientation discrimination is inherently
discrimination based on gender stereotypes; providing that “[s]exual orientation
discrimination is sex discrimination because it necessarily entails treating an
employee less favorably because of the employee’s sex.”76
Baldwin influenced subsequent cases involving alleged sexual orientation
discrimination77, most notably the comparative approach utilized in Hively v. Ivy
Tech Community College of Indiana.78 In Hively, an openly lesbian, part-time
adjunct professor who began teaching at Ivy Tech Community College in 2000,
“applied for at least six full-time positions between 2009 and 2014.”79 These
attempts were unsuccessful, and her employment contract was not renewed.80
The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc granted her appeal, and formulated a
comparative test to determine whether the plaintiff “described a situation in
which, holding all other things constant and changing only her sex, she would
have been treated the same way.”81 The Seventh Circuit concluded that had
Hively been a man, her employer would not have taken any adverse employment
actions for dating a woman; and concluded that she was discriminated against

73. Id. at *7. See Raelynn J. Hillhouse, Reframing the Argument: Sexual Orientation
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination Under Equal Protection, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 49, 87
(2018) (“The gender-stereotyping theory is the most persuasive to federal judges. Seventy-six
percent of courts that reasoned that sexual orientation discrimination either is or may be a form of
sex discrimination embrace the gender-stereotyping theory.”).
74. Baldwin, 2015 WL 439764, at *9.
For example, assume that an employer suspends a lesbian employee for displaying a
photo of her female spouse on her desk, but does not suspend a male employee for
displaying a photo of his female spouse on his desk. The lesbian employee in that
example can allege that her employer took an adverse action against her that the employer
would not have taken had she been male.
Id. at 5. The Ninth Circuit interprets “sex” to include one’s biological sex or gender, permitting a
gender stereotyping claim—this approach requires the plaintiff to established that they have
experienced adverse employment action due to a failure to exhibit traits associated with their
gender. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000).
75. Baldwin, 2015 WL 439764, at *6.
76. Id. at *5.
77. Id. at *1.
78. Surette, supra note 6, at §§ 6–7.
79. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 345.

2020]

Zarda and Sexual Orientation Expression

199

based on her sex and that “employment discrimination on the basis of . . . sexual
orientation . . . [establishes] a case of sex discrimination for Title VII
purposes.”82 The Seventh Circuit, considering Supreme Court precedent with
Baldwin, provided that, “[t]he logic of the Supreme Court’s decisions, as well as
the common-sense-reality that it is actually impossible to discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex, persuade
us . . . .”83 This reasoning became a harbinger, laying a foundation for the
Second Circuit’s en banc ruling.84
III. ZARDA V. ALTITUDE EXPRESS AND NEW HORIZONS
A. Factual Background
Donald Zarda, a gay male, worked as a sky diving instructor for Altitude
Express during the summer of 2010.85 Zarda, as an instructor, regularly
participated in tandem skydives requiring him to be “strapped hip-to-hip and
shoulder-to-shoulder with clients.”86 During a skydiving instruction with a
female client, in an attempt to assuage any discomfort she might experience due
to the physical contact associated with the tandem jump,87 Zarda told her “he
was gay and ha[d] an ex-husband to prove it.”88
After the successful tandem dive, the female client informed her boyfriend of
Zarda’s comment pertaining to his sexual orientation.89 Shortly thereafter, the
boyfriend contacted Zarda’s boss who subsequently fired him.90 Zarda sued
Altitude Express (doing business as Skydive Long Island) and owner Raymond
Maynard, alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII and New York law.91

82. Id. at 351–52.
83. Id. at 350–51.
84. Surette, supra note 6, at § 4.
85. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Zarda regularly informed female clients of his sexual orientation when accompanied
by a spouse or boyfriend. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 80 (2d. Cir. 2017)
89. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108 (stating “the client alleged that Zarda inappropriately touched her
and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior”).
90. Id.
91. Zarda, 855 F.3d at 79–80 (stating “Altitude Express . . . contend[ed] that Zarda was fired
because he failed to provide an enjoyable experience for a customer . . . Zarda assert[ed] . . . [he]
was fired . . . because of his supervisor’s prejudice against homosexuals or because he informed a
client about his sexuality”).
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B. The Ride Up: Procedural Posture
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment; the trial court granted the
defendants’ motion, holding that the Second Circuit did not recognize sexual
orientation discrimination as a cognizable claim under Title VII.92 Zarda
appealed the district court’s decision requesting that the circuit court reconsider
precedent “to hold that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on ‘sex’
encompasses discrimination based on ‘sexual orientation.’”93 The Court of
Appeals declined the request, “[s]ince a three-judge panel . . . lacks the power to
overturn Circuit precedent.”94
C. Back-up Parachute: The EEOC and Zarda’s Second Wind
During initial trial proceedings, the EEOC decided Baldwin, holding that
sexual orientation discrimination is a form of discrimination because of sex.95
In light of the EEOC guidance, the Second Circuit reconsidered Zarda’s petition
and reconvened to reconsider whether Title VII prohibits discrimination based
on sexual orientation.96 The Second Circuit’s en banc decision identified sexual
orientation discrimination as a subset of sex discrimination based on a failure to
adhere to gender norms and ultimately prohibited by Title VII, and thus, a
cognizable claim within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit.97 The effect of
this decision has been widespread—overruling years of Second Circuit
precedence and has influenced decisions in multiple circuits: such as the Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.98

92. Id. at 79.
93. Id. at 80.
94. Id.
95. Baldwin v. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015).
96. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100.
97. Id. at 131–32.
98. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–23 (2d Cir. 2005); Simonton v.
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000). Since Dawson and Simonton, there have been several
subsequent lower court decisions in the Second Circuit. See Cargian v. Breitling USA, Inc., 737 F.
App’x 41, 41 (2d Cir. 2018); Daniel v. T&M Prot. Res. LLC, No. 13 Civ. 4384, 2018 WL 3621810,
at *15–16 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2018); Garay v. Manchester Police Dep’t, No. 3:17cv1596, 2018 WL
1997251, at *1–2 (D. Conn., Apr. 27, 2018) (stating that sexual orientation discrimination is
prohibited by Title VII). Other circuits have also followed, see Somers v. Dig. Realty Trust Inc.,
No. 14-cv-05180, 2018 WL 3730469, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2018); Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co.,
304 F. Supp. 3d 627, 634 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (holding that transgender status is protected under Title
VII); see also EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574 (6th Cir. 2018)
(holding that the EEOC has the jurisdiction to pursue claims of sex discrimination based on
transgender identity).
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D. Jump On: Legislative Intent
The Zarda majority begins its analysis of sexual orientation discrimination by
pointing to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII as a “broad rule of
workplace equality”99 that attacks “the entire spectrum of disparate treatment,”
based on characteristics protected by law,100 and that “Title VII should be
interpreted broadly to achieve equal employment opportunity.”101 Recognizing
that this broad interpretation is not a “blank slate” in deciding whether Title VII
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination; courts must “construe the text in
light of the entirety of the statute as well as relevant precedent.”102 The Second
Circuit is not promoting an interpretation contrary to legislative intent; instead
the opinion focuses on Congress’ broader intent to prohibit “impermissible
consideration of . . . sex . . . in employment practices.”103 Title VII is applied to
reach a broad spectrum of sex discrimination because “sex is necessarily a factor
in sexual orientation.”104
E. Jump On: Sexual Orientation as a Function of Sex—Supreme Court
Jurisprudence
The Zarda majority explores the nature of sexual orientation discrimination
by first consulting the dictionary for a definition of sexual orientation.105 The
Second Circuit noted that in order to recognize a person’s sexual orientation,
you must first acknowledge the person’s sex and the sex of the person to whom
they are attracted.106 The majority states that “Congress intended to make sex
‘irrelevant’ to employment decisions [and] the Supreme Court has held that Title
VII prohibits not just discrimination based on sex . . . but also discrimination
based on traits that are a function of sex, such as life expectancy, and non-

99. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)).
100. Id. (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707–09 (1978)
(holding that having women contribute more to a pension plan because they have a longer life
expectancy violates Title VII)).
101. Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–36 (1971)).
102. Id. at 112.
103. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012)).
104. Id. (“This statutory reading is reinforced . . . because sexual orientation discrimination is
predicated on assumptions about how persons of a certain sex can or should be . . . .”).
105. Id. at 113 (citing Sexual Orientation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The
term ‘sexual orientation’ refers to ‘[a] person’s predisposition or inclination toward sexual activity
or behavior with other males or females.’”)).
106. Id. (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 358 (7th Cir. 2017) (Flaum,
J., concurring) (“One cannot consider a person’s homosexuality without also accounting for their
sex: doing so would render ‘same’ [sex] . . . meaningless.”)).
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conformity with gender norms.”107 Application of traits that are a “function” or
a “proxy” of sex accords with the Supreme Court’s view that Title VII applies
to more than “the principal evil Congress was concerned with” when the statute
was enacted in 1964,”108 and that it applies to “reasonably comparable evils.”109
To reinforce their conclusion, the Second Circuit used a “comparative test”110
that asks, “whether an employee’s treatment would have been different ‘but for
that person’s sex.’”111 For example, if a lesbian employee successfully
performing her duties was denied employment and a male in the same position
who was attracted to women received a promotion, sex is part of the
consideration because the female employee would not have been denied a
promotion “but for” her gender.112 Finally, the Second Circuit utilized the
gender stereotyping approach steeped in the logic of Price Waterhouse,113
equating Zarda’s termination for his sexuality as akin to being terminated for not
living up to the gender stereotype that men should date women.114
F. Tandem with the Majority: Concurrences
Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs concurred with the majority in observing that
Zarda raised a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII and that sexual
orientation is a subset of sex discrimination.115 However, he differed from the
majority on multiple jurisdictional matters.116 Circuit Judge Jose A. Cabranes
concurred only in the judgement, providing, “Zarda’s sexual orientation is a
function of his sex. Discrimination against (him) because of his sexual
orientation therefore is discrimination because of his sex, and is prohibited by
Title VII. That should be the end of the analysis.”117 Circuit Judge Robert Sack

107. Id. at 112 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989); L.A. Dep’t
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
436 (1971)).
108. Id. at 115 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 116 (using the Court’s “comparative test” to determine whether a basis for
discrimination is a function of sex).
111. Id. (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711).
112. Id. The Zarda court echoed the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Hively, to conclude
that, “it follows that sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination.” Id. (citing
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017)).
113. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989).
114. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 133 (Jacobs, J., concurring); see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 250–
51.
115. Id. at 132.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 135 (Cabranes, J., concurring).
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concurred only on the grounds that sexual orientation is a form of gender
stereotyping discrimination, (i.e., acting or not acting in a way associated with a
person’s sex).118
Circuit Judge Raymond Lohier, Jr. concurred in the ultimate holding, stating,
“I agree with the majority opinion that there is no reasonable way to disentangle
sex from sexual orientation in interpreting the plain meaning of the words
‘because of . . . sex.’”119 Judge Lohier dedicated the majority of his concurrence
in attacking the dissent’s “common meaning of the words” approach.120 His
concurrence criticized the dissent’s plain meaning approach in applying the
intent of Congress at the time of the statute’s passing because it ignored Supreme
Court precedent.121 He also addressed the dissent’s approach in finding a
“contemporary” and “public” meaning of sex as a “roundabout search for
legislative history.”122
G. Free Fall: The Dissent
The dissent begins with Judge Gerald E. Lynch expressing his desire for
Congress to pass legislation adding sexual orientation to Title VII protections.123
After, he embarks on a lengthy history of the civil rights movement for African
Americans, the pro-women movement and compares it to the history of the
LGBTQ rights movement, landing on the premise that the historical intent of

118. Id. at 135–36 (Sack, J., concurring).
We are now called upon to address questions dealing directly with sex, sexual behavior,
and sexual taboos, a discussion fraught with moral, religious, political, psychological,
and other highly charged issues. For those reasons (among others), I think it is in the
best interests of us all to tread carefully; to say no more than we must . . . .
Id. at 135.
119. Id. at 136 (Lohier, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 136–37.
121. Id. (“Time and time again, the Supreme Court has told us that the cart of legislative history
is pulled by the plain text, not the other way around. The text here pulls in one direction, namely,
that sex includes sexual orientation.”).
122. Id. at 137.
123. Id. (Lynch, J. & Livingston, J., dissenting).
Speaking solely as a citizen, I would be delighted to awake one morning and learn that
Congress had just passed legislation adding sexual orientation to the list of grounds of
employment discrimination prohibited under Title VII . . . . I am confident that one day—
and I hope that day comes soon—I will have that pleasure.
I would be equally pleased to awake to learn that Congress had secretly passed such
legislation more than a half century ago—until I actually woke up and realized that I
must have been still asleep and dreaming. Because we all know that Congress did no
such thing.
Id.
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Title VII was to provide protections against workplace discrimination based on
race, national origin and religion.124
The argument then transitions to addressing the majority’s use of “judicial
interpretations of Title VII as prohibiting sexual harassment, and allowing
hostile work environment claims, in an effort to argue that the expansion they
are making simply follows in this line [of reasoning].”125 Judge Lynch counters
the majority by explaining that the statute’s use of race to include all racial
groups means that the word sex was to include both men and women.126 He
addresses sexual harassment and exploitation as being included because it has
been an enduring subject of legislative attention, stating “Representative Smith’s
amendment, both the literal language . . . and the elimination of the social evil
at which it was aimed,” meaning that the statute must be read to include it. 127
He reasoned the same for the inclusion of the now established hostile work
environment protections.128 He then suggests that though sexual orientation
discrimination may be immoral or economically inefficient, not everything with
those qualities are illegal; therefore until the legislative process deems
otherwise, it shall remain legal.129
After a lengthy attack on the Majority’s linguistic argument,130 Judge Lynch
distinguishes the holding in Price Waterhouse, opining that the type of gender
stereotyping that was found to violate Title VII is more similar to the initial
purpose that Congress intended and that it involves one sex being systematically
disadvantaged over the other.131 Judge Lynch characterizes Donald Zarda’s
treatment by his employer as “not just,” but counters this by noting that the
Constitution protects against discrimination from the government in regards to

124. Id. at 137–48.
125. Id. at 145–46.
[T]he prohibition of sex discrimination by its plain language protects men as well as
women, whether or not anyone who voted on the bill specifically considered whether and
under what circumstances men could be victims of gender-based discrimination. That is
not an expansion of Title VII, but is a conclusion mandated by its text.
Id.
126. Id. at 145–47 (“Sexual exploitation has been a principal obstacle to the equal participation
of women in the workplace, and whether or not individual legislators intended to prohibit it . . . .”).
127. Id. at 147.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 148.
130. Id. at 137–57.
131. Id. at 157 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1998) (“An employer
who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an
intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if
they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”).
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the fundamental right to marry, “but it does not promise freedom from
discrimination by their fellow citizens.”132
III. ANALYSIS: A SUCCESSFUL DIVE
Zarda is a soundly reasoned Title VII decision;133 it successfully incorporates
Supreme Court approaches to legislative interpretation and progressive Title VII
reasoning to hold that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of Title VII
prohibition.134 It is practicable because it does not create a new class of protected
persons, nor does it argue that Title VII expressly prohibits sexual orientation
discrimination. Instead, the Second Circuit provides a pathway, paved by
Supreme Court jurisprudence, to logically conclude that sexual orientation
discrimination is a form of discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
A. Tradition: The Weakness of the Legislative Intent Argument
Legislative intent is persuasive. Historically, a majority of courts have
excluded sexual orientation from Title VII protections because reasoned that
Congress had no initial intent for sexual orientation protections.135 The Zarda
majority address this argument well by focusing on Supreme Court
interpretation. Focusing too much on legislative history may not accurately
reflect Congressional intent given the nefarious way “sex” was introduced to
Title VII. The limited legislative guidance should lead to a broadly construed
reading of the text, reflecting the overall intent of Title VII: to eliminate

132. Id. at 166.
133. Pratt v. Haw. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Civ. No. 17-00599, 2018 WL 5850177, at *11 (D.
Haw. Nov. 8, 2018). See J. Shahar Dillbary & Griffin Edwards, An Empirical Analysis of Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 86 U CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2019). The article praises Zarda’s reasoning
as it eliminates a defense under this scenario: An African American male with perfect credentials
applies for a job while wearing what some would consider women’s clothing and is denied. Id. at
15–16. In a case where the motive is ambiguous (i.e., racial vs. sexual orientation discrimination),
the employer could deny racial motivation by using the defense that the adverse action was based
on perceived sexual orientation. Id. See generally Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking
Gay Enough for Title VII, 14 DUKEMINIER AWARDS 715 (2015). Individuals who appear to be gay
but never verify or provide their sexuality have been afforded success in gender stereotyping cases;
however gay employees whose sexuality is revealed by preference, association, relationship status
or via casual conversation are less meritorious, as many jurisdictions do not permit sexual
orientation discrimination as a form of gender stereotyping claims. Id. at 741–42, 755–57.
134. John Richards & Brett Janich, A Practitioner’s Guide to Zarda v. Altitude Express, LAW
360 (March 5, 2018, 12:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1018180/a-practitioner-s-guideto-zarda-v-altitude-express. The Second Circuit used three separate constitutional theories
established by the Supreme Court: because of sex, sex stereotype, and associational discrimination
theories to reach the single conclusion that Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination. Id.
135. Surette, supra note 6, at § 2.
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impermissible workplace discriminations. Broad construction is not merely a
convenient means to extend protections to LGBTQ employees and applicants; it
also aligns with the broad construction approach overwhelmingly utilized by the
Supreme Court in Title VII cases. The Supreme Court has recognized that Title
VII should apply to “reasonably comparable evils;”136 narrowly construing sex
by its plain meaning is contrapositive to the Supreme Court’s approach. Zarda
correctly addresses the broad aims of Congress in striking at an array of
workplace discrimination while utilizing Supreme Court precedent as a guide.
The Zarda dissent argue for the false dichotomy—that until Congress makes
sexual orientation discrimination illegal, it shall be legal—and because Congress
has not made it illegal, it further enforces the argument that Title VII does not
include sexual orientation discrimination protections. In light of relevant law,
this argument is weak. First, there is nothing in the text of Title VII that
expressly provides these protections to heterosexuals only.137 Second,
Congressional inaction as a reason to deny protection to LGBTQ individuals is
unpersuasive. Laws uniformly criminalizing domestic violence and the ending
of coverture laws developed first from the courts while Congress remained
silent.138 Why can the Court act prior to Congressional prohibition for some
injustices and not others? The dissent’s argument is an unsatisfactory way of
answering this crucial question. If one can conclude that sexual orientation
discrimination is not prohibited because Congress has not expressly proscribed
it, “‘several equally tenable inferences’ may be drawn from such inaction,
‘including the inference that the existing legislation’”139 is not a valid indication
of whether sex discrimination encompasses sexual orientation.
The Zarda dissent makes an attempt to explain the hasty addition of “sex” by
providing that because pro-women legislation has been a topic of Congressional
debate before ratification and that there was a strong push from interest groups
to include the surreptitiously added provision one day before the vote, that it is
logical to read Congress’ intent to protect only women from invidious
discrimination in the workplace. This, too, conveniently dismisses the fact that
sex was not added or proposed by the same special interest groups that the

136. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
137. Surette, supra note 6, at § 2.
138. An example of an action that has been universally proscribed in U.S. jurisdictions that
was not prohibited by an act of Congress is state withdrawal of coverture laws on constitutional
grounds (coverture was the common law term to describe the exemption given to husbands in cases
of marital rape; because a woman’s rights were subsumed to her husband’s, a wife could not legally
bring a claim for rape). See Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to
Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 352 (1995). Similarly, the criminalization of domestic
violence first had its movement by state and constitutional arguments, not legislative. See Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Criminal Law: Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 969–71 (2004).
139. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting United
States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)).
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dissent credits in having ushered the legislation through. Attempting to use an
absence of legislative intent to reason that sexual orientation should not be
included ignores the Supreme Court’s interpretation and places too much
emphasis on the plain text of a provision that was intentioned to stifle the entirety
of protections the Civil Rights Act was intended to provide.
It seems illogical for the dissent to place so much emphasis on the legislative
intent while ignoring the history of the statute. In Judge Lynch’s rationale for
not extending Title VII protections to sexual orientation, which is utilized by a
majority of jurisdictions, he suggests that while the Constitution promises
protection from discrimination from the government it does not protect from
discrimination by fellow citizens. This logic does not work. Despite correctly
identifying that the Constitution does not promise protection from
discrimination by fellow citizens, it fails to realize that Title VII does just that!
It promises a multitude of protections from discrimination by fellow citizens in
the workplace.
The Zarda dissent argues for the premise that: while Title VII protects
individuals from discrimination by fellow citizens in the workplace on the basis
of race, religion, gender, and even a lack of conformance to gender stereotypes,
it should NOT be extended to include sexual orientation because the
Constitution does not explicitly promise it. The Constitution makes no explicit
promise of protection from workplace discrimination on the basis of race or
religion either; yet those protections are extant under Title VII.
B. Gender Stereotyping
The strongest argument for including sexual orientation discrimination within
the protections of Title VII is the prohibition against gender stereotyping. The
holding in Price Waterhouse, and the reasonably comparable evils approach of
Oncale140 are highly persuasive. Denying a promotion to a female because she
acts too masculine is impermissible because it necessarily takes her gender into
account. Likewise, if an employer fires a male employee for being gay, it is
necessarily relying on sex because one cannot disapprove of a person’s sexual
orientation without first taking into consideration the sex of that person.
The Zarda dissent acknowledges Title VII extends to reasonably comparable
evils of Congress’ intent and argues that the prohibition of gender stereotyping
is within the original intent of the statute. Under this reasoning, it would be
unlawful to fire a male because his superior believed that he acted too feminine,
but it would be permissible to fire him for being gay. There is a fundamental
danger in this because as it stands in a majority of jurisdictions, sexual
orientation discrimination can be used as a defense against other forms of
discrimination. For example, if a lesbian African American is denied promotion
due to discrimination, she may assert a claim that she was discriminated against

140. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75.
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due to her race and/or gender. The employer could defend against this
accusation by simply claiming she was denied because she is gay, creating a
lawful defense to an impermissible consideration of race and gender. The
Supreme Court has provided a guide to this inconsistency: the extension of Title
VII protection to reasonably comparable evils. The majority correctly identifies
the inconsistency and construes precedent to establish that firing an employee
for being gay is a reasonably comparable evil to firing a female employee for
acting too masculine, or terminating an employee based on race, religion or
national origin.
IV. CONCLUSION
Zarda is soundly reasoned. The Second Circuit correctly applied Baldwin;
however, Baldwin should serve as only a blueprint. Although the EEOC has
been vested by Congress to have the authority to interpret and apply Title VII,
courts have inconsistently relied on the agency’s decisions. The EEOC often
changes guidance on these matters.
The Supreme Court, in Oncale and Price Waterhouse, established that Title
VII covers reasonably comparable evils, and that adverse action in employment
matters due to failure to adhere to gender roles is an impermissible consideration
of sex. The Zarda court’s reasoning illustrates the undeniable link between
sexual orientation discrimination and impermissible consideration of gender in
adverse employment actions. The function of this decision is further illustrated
by the subsequent circuit holdings; evidencing a persuasive argument. The value
in this approach is that it proscribes sexual orientation discrimination without
creating an additional protected class. Linking sexual orientation discrimination
to gender stereotyping is a practical method to ensure that people are protected
in their employment from characteristics that have no relevance to the job duties
they are fulfilling. An employee’s sexual orientation has the same correlation
to the effectiveness of job performance as does an employee’s marital status,
race, or national origin. Title VII should be interpreted to fully realize its
potential: to strike at discrimination in the work force, eliminating
considerations of an employee’s life that do not relate to employment. The law
should not be read to allow some forms of discrimination and not others when
the Supreme Court precedent has soundly interpreted Congress’ intent to apply
to reasonably comparative evils.

